It is one thing to experience a train wreck but another to survive the impact. In essence, the Carlton Football Club were facing the proverbial wreck early in the 21st century and had to work out how to best survive the crash intact. Let’s not understate the severity of our position in 2003 – consecutive years at the very foot of the ladder, the incurrence of significant financial losses, and a list suffering from years of trading early or failing with early draft picks. In addition, there was the added penalty of the 2002 salary cap breaches. In some respects, Carlton had already hit an approaching train at full speed; the only thing left to do was salvage whatever we could from the wreckage.

In order to understand a little about the decisions made collectively by the ‘Club’ at the end of 2003, you should understand some of the history of Carlton in the decade beforehand:

• Carlton were a dominant force in the mid 1990’s, winning the 1995 Grand Final and competing in the finals from 1993 to 1996. Despite the sheer strength of the 1995 win, many sections of the press were labelling the Blues as ‘too old’ as early as 1993, in the face of the youth of our main adversaries of the time such as Essendon, the Kangaroos, and Geelong;
• Faced with the demise of this unit, but perhaps enthused by the ability of some of our senior players to play well into their 30’s such as Bradley, Madden and Kernahan, the Blues displayed a penchant for trading away early draft picks for so-called ‘senior’ players from other Clubs. Although not the only Club to do this, the regularity of the move provided a clear signal of support to the then President’s famous claim of ‘We don’t rebuild at Carlton’. Michael Mansfield, Stephen O'Reilly, Corey McKernan, Mick McGuane and Craig Devonport, to name some of the main trades, came to Carlton in return for early to mid tier draft picks;
• When the Blues did decide to take-on the National Draft, we did so without great success. Although in today’s day and age the success of early draft picks is more widely accepted and supported, the first 10 years of the Draft system provided it’s fair share of failures in the high picks. The Blues of the mid 1990’s were no different, with early draft picks Murray Vance (Pick #6, 1998) and Kris Massie (Pick #7, 1997) failing to earn a permanent position in the team at the time; and, finally
• On the eve of the 2002 National Draft, the AFL announced significant draft penalties on the Club for salary cap breaches uncovered over 2001 – 2002. The effect of the penalties was to deprive Carlton of our first and second round selections in both the 2002 and 2003 National Drafts, among others. Further, the Blues would not be allowed to trade into the first 2 rounds of 2003 either, meaning that we had to trade for players rather than draft picks in that year.

Another element that you should consider is our result in Season 2002. It remains questionable whether the Blues understood the position they were in after 2002, the year in which the mighty Carlton Football Club fell heavily and suddenly to our first wooden spoon. Sure, the Club changed Coaches in a blaze of controversy, but it could be argued that some of the impetus behind the appointment of Denis Pagan was to sure-up the Presidency of John Elliott. The recruitment of a proven Premiership Coach for the 2003 season may not have saved Elliott, but it could have brought an external view to the list, one that arguably was sorely lacking. At the time, many fans still believed that we had a strong list, but one that suffered significantly due to injury. There is much to support this latter argument, with Ratten, Hickmott and Koutoufides all having significant stints on the sidelines in 2002, and it would seem that the Club agreed. So the Blues attacked 2003 with a new Coach but much the same list, providing much the same result with a very lucky 15th position.

Despite our relative success in 1999-2001 with 3 finals performances in a row, including the surprise 1999 Grand Final berth, the Carlton list hit 2003 in very bad shape. The list could be characterised as one of thirds; 1) a significant group of talented senior players of 28 years of age, including McKernan, McKay, Ratten, Hickmott, Manton, Allan, Koutoufides, Camporeale and Beaumont, 2) a small group of emerging leaders including Whitnall, Prendergast, Lappin, Hulme and French and 3) a large group of younger players drafted largely with late picks or rookie selections. The significant exceptions to the generalisation of the latter group were a young Jarrad Waite and our three early selections in the 2000 Draft, Livingston, Wiggins and Sporn. Without being critical of this grouping, it is only Waite who could be said to be an immediate selection in the ‘Best 22’ of any team in 2005, some 3 seasons later.

Years of trading away early selections for senior players had started to hurt the Blues in terms of the size and quality of our younger group of players. Years of scraping away with late picks definitely brought some gold, such as Brad Fisher, Darren Hulme and Ryan Houlihan, but on the balance of probabilities the chances of continuing to ‘win’ with late picks are against you. As the senior list began to age, our small group of emerging leaders were asked to step up, but many had their own issues to deal with, including their own playing form and role in the team.

In addition, season 2003 saw the retirement of three of our favourite sons, Brett Ratten, Adrian Hickmott and Andrew McKay. These retirements started the dismantling of the ‘senior tier’ of players that underpinned our finals performances in 1999-2001, and started to bring home to roost he quandary facing the Club – both our mid and junior tiers were not able or ready to take the Club forward. Each retirement was heartbreaking in it’s own right – Ratten would retire after his Round 10 injury against Fremantle; Hickmott would retire after Round 16 when it was clear that his Osteitis Pubis was degenerating, and McKay would leave the Club at the end of the season, on a high after winning the best & Fairest award.

In the background, some of the remaining ‘Leadership Group’ were implicated in rumblings against the Coach. On more than two occasions in the season, Channel 10’s ‘Sports Tonight’ would report of player dissent against Pagan’s style, and perhaps game-plan, including Manton, Allan and Beaumont. Rumours of this ‘mutiny’ were compounded when in Round 22, 2003, the Kangaroos tore the Blues apart in a game where it felt as though we gave up chasing by half-time. Fevola would work hard to kick 4, and Houlihan, Camporeale, Lappin and the ever-hard working McCormick would earn their fair share of the ball, but the Blues appeared disinterested and dishevelled. Whether it was just the end of consecutive poor seasons, or whether many players knew their time at Carlton had ended, or even whether we were plainly & simply a poor Club at a very low ebb, the Blues were appalling and left a bad taste in every fan’s mouth. The intent of this article is not to take sides in any internal debate should it have occurred, after all, One man’s rebel is another man’s freedom fighter, however, as a fan it is hard to stomach the thought of your team not giving 100% on the field when representing the Navy Blue.

It could be argued that even in the absence of such a ‘mutiny’ theory, the Blues needed to dramatically change the list. The remaining senior grouping were still ageing, we still had a minimal mid-tier of players with the exception of Whitnall and Lappin, and our younger players were finding it hard in amongst the mountain of mountainous losses the Blues suffered over 2002 and 2003.

It was clear to all that action needed to be taken. Pagan was a celebrated dual Premiership Coach and perhaps would not have been used to seeing such a low level of performance. The administration needed a significant lift to offset the reporting of exceedingly high financial losses and cashflow difficulties, let alone catch up with our esteemed Melbourne competitors, the Bombers and the Pies, who appeared to be rolling in cash at the time. The Blues name had taken yet another hit and rather than take it lying down, the proudest of AFL clubs had to fight back.

It is one thing to recognise that action must be taken, another thing entirely to know what action must be taken. Reporting at the time fails to pin down Pagan or Collins as to the specific strategy utilised in the rush that became the 2003 recruitment period. However, there are a number of ‘trains of thought’ to use our original metaphor that are discussed as possibilities:

1. The Club needed to remove the ‘mutiny’ elements of our performances in 2003 (if this is indeed true), and set about to remove such players at any cost;
2. The Club decided to recruit players who would potentially be aligned to the Coach’s style, or gameplan, easily;
3. The Club recognised that our senior group would shortly no longer be with us, and that there was a dramatic shortage of mid-tier players capable of leading the Club into the finals. This required the Blues to bring in a ‘new’ group of mid-tier players as potential future leaders of the Club;
4. The Club recognised the status of the list and understood that our turnaround was going to take a considerable period of time. Such a turnaround was likely to generate a high number of early draft picks. Therefore, a strategy could have been to recruit relatively young but hard working players as a buffer for the younger players; or
5. The Club recognised that in order to protect the upcoming stream of younger players it needed to recruit some strong and hard bodied players as ‘protection’.

Perhaps there’s an element of each theory in the final strategy utilised by the Blues in the recruiting period. One thing’s for sure - in amongst all of these competing theories is the draft penalties placed on Carlton for the 2002 and 2003 Drafts. Although allowing the Blues to keep the Priority Pick earned from winning less than 5 games in Season 2003, the Blues’ next live pick was Pick 35. Further, we could not trade players for picks in the first 2 rounds. Thus, the Blues needed players to rebuild the list, but were restricted in exactly what we could do. Fans were twiddling their thumbs in eager anticipation for a turnaround, but many of the tools you would normally seek to utilise were unavailable to be used. Beyond the lost selections, a lack of early draft selections on the list meant there was precious little of interest to other Clubs for trade purposes.

Surprisingly and perhaps counter-intuitively, another limiting factor for the Blues at this time was the salary cap. Despite consecutive bottom finishes, the Blues had a scarcity of salary cap available as a result of a series of high-priced and outstanding contracts offered to some players. This would indeed be an achilles heel for the Blues over much of the 1990’s and 2000’s, but it may have been more than just an incidental benefit behind the trading of Beaumont and McKernan in particular.

The events of the 2003 trade period and drafts surprised many. What began as a need to replenish the list ended as a player turnover not seen before for quantity or speed. In a series of trades and late draft picks, the Blues used a solitary pick on youth, that of Andrew Walker at Pick #2, and traded for or selected a long series of players in the system for a minimum of 3 years, including two perennial performers in the lower VFL league (Deluca, Kenna). Each of these moves are outlined below:

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In a series of manoeuvres and late draft picks, just under half of the Carlton list was changed over at the end of 2003 in anticipation of Season 2004. A handful of senior players were moved away from Carlton in return for lesser known, but generally younger and cheaper, and lesser credentialled players. A number of ‘Second Chance Tickets’ were handed out to players from other clubs, including Teague, Morrell and McGrath, and ‘First Chance Tickets’ to players who had been in-system for some time such as DeLuca and Kenna. In terms of recruiting theory, the Blues had cleared out much of the ‘mid-tier’ and senior tier, with Club stalwarts Koutoufides, Camporeale, Whitnall and Lappin effectively the sole remaining leaders of Carlton. Further, a large number of the younger players on the list also found themselves on the outer.

By blatantly selecting ‘ready made’ players at the expense of youth, the Club opened itself up to severe criticism from the press and fans alike. Our improved performances in 2004 managed to subdue such criticism, but our 2005 slide back to the bottom re-opened this can of worms amongst many in the footy community. By the end of Season 2005, 9 of the 19 2003 recruits had moved on, and a number of others, including DeLuca, Bannister and Teague were not automatic selections in our starting 22. On the flip side, 3 of the Rookies had been promoted, Stevens became one of our premier midfielders and Walker had shown considerable promise.

However, much of the debate around the Great Turnover of 2003 surrounds the extent of the Second Chance Tickets handed out by the Club at the expense of youth. Although very few fans would argue that the 2004 list was superior to 2003 if you exclude the retirements of Club favourites Ratten, Mckay and Hickmott, it remains contentious whether this approach had a real long-term view. It could arguably be proving detrimental to the Club right now, given the absence of a groundswell of young players coming through. This argument, especially given the pain experienced by Carlton fans in between 2002 and 2005, is perhaps the main driver behind the feeling that the Blues mismanaged over 2003 recruiting. Did we shoot ourselves in the foot?

In order to answer this question you must understand that there were a number of useful, young players selected relatively late in the 2003 National Draft. You must also be aware that this is an analysis in hindsight, for from a distance the chance of Pick 40 being a great player is technically a lower probability than Pick 39, and higher probability than Pick 41, but other than that, it’s just names in a hat. In 2003, Sansbury (Roos), Dyson (Bombers), Pettigrew (Port), Fisher (St Kilda) and Hudson (Crows) are all useful players and were taken prior to Pick 60, and the Tigers took Hartigan and Tuck late in the draft when only Richmond and the Blues were fighting it out. In addition, Buchanan (Swans) was redrafted after injury. I have left Buchanan out of the analysis as it was very unlikely anyone at the time would be able to see through his continuous ankle injuries and foresee his 2005 finals campaigns.

From a true hindsight point of view, it is therefore possible that the Blues could have picked up these players rather than trade away picks 35 and 51 (Scotland and Harford / Johnson respectively) or recruit differently late in the draft. This is particularly relevant in 2005 with Bowyer, Johnson and Morrell all moving on, and Kenna and Mott leaving in 2004.

The basis of comparison for alternative strategies requires consideration – do we assess on games played, or quality of games played? Given Beaumont, Allan and Murphy are no longer playing AFL, do we take into account the fact that their replacements at Carlton may still be running around for the Blues and playing games or providing leadership? Given our salary cap issues, do we take the relative ‘cheapness’ of certain players into account? Let’s look at some of the more contentious ones:

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In essence, there are a number of ‘nil all’ draws in the above table, where players on either side of the trade finished up within a similar time period. The Pick 51 trade in particular looks a clear loss to the Blues and one that would have been better prevented than executed. If we were allowed to pick & choose those trades we would keep, then it is clear that you would seek to unravel this one, at all times aware that the player you may have selected with Pick 51 may not have become a player. Overall, the Blues secured McGrath and Teague through these trades, and lost 4 senior (and perhaps expensive) players. It is up to these two to determine through their careers whether the strategy was successful, again, at all times aware that all 4 ‘Outs’ in the above table have retired and can no longer win a game for their adopted team nor be the difference in a Premiership year.

In terms of the draft picks, it is hard to argue in hindsight that we could not have made better choices. However, would that view change if Bannister and DeLuca go on to play 100 games for the Blues? If so, it would be hard to argue that we made the wrong decision, perhaps it would be another draw?

Possibly the greatest thing about Carlton is that we are on the way to recovery after the 2002 –2003 train wreck. Despite a slow financial turnaround, membership and sponsorship of this successful Club has rebounded as the fans have regrouped around the Blues. This in itself is a great achievement and should be recognised. In amongst the assessment of our 2003 recruiting strategies, one must consider the background to the problems and the options we had available to us, including the limitations on drafting and shortfalls in the salary cap. One could argue that we handed out too many second chances at the expense of youth, but it will take time to determine once and for all the benefits of the strategy.